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11 Introduction
Most developed countries will face, over the next …fty years, an unprecedented
ageing of their population, as the Baby Boom generation grows old and the
mortality rates decrease. The most serious problem associated with the current
population ageing is the enormous tax burden it imposes on the next generation.
Sustaining the existing social security system, which is a Pay-as-You-Go (PAYG)
system, requires substantial increases in the payroll tax rates. This tax increase
will create a demographic politico-economic con‡ict between the active workforce
and the retired [Von Weizsacker (1990)]. A proposal aimed at lessening these
tensions is to switch from the current PAYG system to a fully-funded pension
system; a closely related proposal is to privatize the social security system [see
Altig and Gokhale(1997), Feldstein and Samwick (1998) and Kotliko¤ (1996)].
These authors focus on the tax burden to be accepted if the budget of the PAYG
system is to be balanced, and on the work disincentive that it would create.
However, there is at least one more factor to take into account when considering
the long-run implications of such a profound structural change, namely the e¤ect
of social security reform on fertility. We will see that taking explicitly into account
fertility issues dramatically alter the assessment of the impact of the proposed
reform.
In this paper, we extend the learning-by-doing model of Grossman and Yana-
gawa (1993) [GY] to allow for endogenous fertility. We show that, in this con-
text, higher fertility leads to lower economic growth. Furthermore, we show that
a PAYG system will be characterised by a lower fertility than a fully-funded
system. Hence, switching from a PAYG to a fully-funded system might reduce
economic growth.
Our basic setup is a three-period overlapping generations economy. Each
generation lives three periods: (i) childhood when raised by one’s parents, (ii)
adulthood in which the individual works, pays taxes, raises children, saves, and
2provides for its parents because of pure altruism (ascending altruism),2 (iii) re-
tirement in which the individual lives o¤ its social security bene…ts, its savings,
and the gift provided by its children. This setting immediately provides for an
endogenous fertility rationale as adults can think of children as a type of asset,
whose initial price is the cost of raising a kid, and whose payo¤ is the monetary
transfer (gift) that the child will provide when it reaches adulthood. Unlike GY,
who assumed an exogenous fertility rate, the balanced growth rate in our model
will depend not only savings but also on fertility.
Why does higher fertility lead to lower growth? Consider the problem of an
adult living at time t. Optimization requires this agent to equate the marginal
utility from altruism (the gift to one’s parents) a time t to the discounted value of
the marginal utility of consumption at t + 1. The higher the fertility rate n, the
more gifts from the children to their parents, the higher the marginal utility from
altruism. On the balanced growth equilibrium path, this agent will get (1 + g)
times the consumption as his parents in the current period where g is the rate
of growth of the economy. The higher the growth rate, the higher consumption
in the next period, the lower the marginal utility. Equating the two marginal
utilities implies a negative relationship between n and g.
Why is a PAYG system associated with a lower fertility than a fully-funded
system? Let us compare two economies which are identical except that the …rst
one uses a PAYG system and the other a fully-funded system. Let us start this
comparison by setting the contribution rate ts to zero in both economies, then
simultaneously increasing this rate. When ts = 0, both economies are essentially
in the same situation as if there was no social security system at all, hence
their fertility rate (and all other endogenous variables) are identical. When ts
2Voluntary transfer from children to parents commonly happens in Asia countries(Korea,
Japan, and China etc) because those countries, steeped in benign Buddhist traditions, depend
heavily on the family system to provide the bulk of support for the elderly. Andrews and others
(1986), Martin (1988), and Kinsella (1992) argue that there are signi…cant family support for
the elderly in Asian countries.
3increases in the fully-funded system, the increase in the contribution to the social
security system is exactly o¤set by a decrease in private savings, an instance
of the “Ricardian equivalence theorem”, see Blanchard and Fisher (1989). The
rebalancing of savings between the social security fund and private savings is the
only e¤ect of the increase in ts. Hence, the economy with the fully-funded system
experiences no change in its fertility rate. When ts increases in the PAYG system,
parents can count on higher public support in their old age, hence investing in
children as a mean of support in old age becomes less attractive. Consequently,
increasing ts will decrease fertility in the PAYG system.
Our results provide a novel theoretical explanation for the empirical …ndings
of Sala-I-Martin (1996) who found that the strongest explanatory variable with
a positive e¤ect on economic growth was the amount of public transfers. An
other message from our analysis is that a switch from a PAYG system to a
fully funded system may be harmful not only to a developed countries su¤ering
from low rates of economic growth, but also to developing countries su¤ering
from overpopulation, an interesting and important fodder for thoughts for most
people interested in public …nance.
Although a PAYG system might provide growth bene…ts, it does so by de-
creasing fertility rather than increasing total savings and capital accumulation.
Indeed, low savings rate in the US have long been a source of concern. In recent
years, favourable tax treatments of capital income, such as the IRA in the US,
were meant to stimulate savings by low-income agents. However, these programs
did not o¤er any incentives for additional savings for most high-income house-
holds as they were already saving more than the maximum eligible amount even
before the introduction of the IRAs. In fact, there is little empirical evidence
that the IRAs stimulated household savings between 1983 and 1986 (Gale and
Scholz (1992)). We are proposing a new pension scheme, the Saving Subsidy
Program (SSP), which can remedy this drawback. It combines a minimum social
security bene…t with a subsidy to individual’s savings which stimulate savings
4and enhances the long-run balanced growth rate.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. In
section 3 and 4, we …nd the balanced growth rate and present the concept of
open-loop equilibrium . In section 5, we analyse the e¤ects of social security on
the balanced growth rate. In section 6, we study the saving subsidy program and
its comparative dynamics. Section 7 draws the conclusion.
2 Model
The economy which we are going to describe here is an extension of the endoge-
nous growth model of GY. We assume a discrete time setting, t = 0, 1, ..., and a
three-period overlapping generations (OLG) framework. All agents in the same
generation are identical. In their …rst period of life, children take no economic
decision and are cared-for by their adult parents. Upon becoming adults in their
second period of life, agents work, decide on how many children to have and raise
them, provide a private gift to their own old parents, and save. In their third pe-
riod of life, old agents retire and live o¤ their savings and o¤ their adult o¤spring’
gift. The size of the population Nt follows the dynamics Nt+1 = (1+nt)Nt, where
nt is the fertility rate. In each period a single homogenous good is produced. This
good can be consumed or stored as capital for next period.
2.1 Utility Function
We follow Nishmura and Zhang [NZ] (1992) characterisation of the agents’ pref-
erences with ascending altruism. Agents derive utility from their consumption
during their lifetime and from the consumption of their old parents. In our frame-
work, agents take no economic decision in their …rst period of life when they are
children. The expenditure on rearing children is exogenous. In this paper, we
do not consider decisions about education. Hence, consumption and all other
variables relating to childhood are constants. For simplicity and without loss
5of generality, we will ignore them. We assume that the intertemporal utility







t ); µ;¿ > 0; (1)
where ct
t denotes the adult period consumption at time t, ct
t+1 the old age con-
sumption at time t + 1, µ the discount factor, c
t¡1
t the parents’ consumption at
time t and ¿ is the degree of altruism of children towards their parents. If ¿ = 0,
there is no ascending altruism. In this case, adults will not beget any children as
kids are regarded as “capital goods” in our model and we will assume ¿ > 0 for
the reminder of the paper. We assume that the inter-temporal utility function
(1) has the following properties.
² Assumption 1. The intertemporal utility function is additively separable
and homothetic.
² Assumption 2. The utility function in each period, u is continuous and
twice di¤erentiable, u0 > 0 and u00 < 0.
² Assumption 3. The utility function is strictly concave and increasing,
de…ned on the positive orthan <2
+ ! <+, and, to avoid corner solutions, we
assume that the indi¤erence curves do not touch the axis, i.e. lim




Following NZ’s approach, we assume that the total cost of raising children, h(1+
nt), is an non-decreasing function of the number of children, 1 + nt, and is twice
di¤erentiable. Speci…cally, the total child-rearing cost is
h(1 + nt) ´ a(1 + nt)
b; a > 0; 1 > b > 0;
where a is the exogenous cost of raising a single child (per parent) and b measures
the concavity of the child-rearing cost. The condition 1 > b > 0 means that there
are economies of scale in raising children.
6We assume a competitive labour market and an inelastic labour supply. An
adult earns the wage (Wt) which he uses to consume in that period (ct
t), to save
(St), to raise children (1 + nt), and to provide a gift (Gt) to his parents due to
their ascending altruism.3 In the old age, the elderly consume the proceeds from
their savings, their social security bene…t (bt+1) and the gift from their children.




t = Wt(1 ¡ ts ¡ Gt ¡ a(1 + nt)
b) ¡ St; (2)
c
t
t+1 = (1 + rt+1)St + (1 + nt)Wt+1Gt+1 + bt+1; (3)
where ts denotes the pension contribution rate and bt+1 the social security bene…t.
We impose a balanced budget constraint on the social security system, i.e.
bt+1 = (1 + nt)Wt+1ts:
The government adjusts the payroll tax rate to keep the social security system
solvent.
Under the fully funded pension system, the budget constraints are
c
t
t = Wt(1 ¡ ts ¡ Gt ¡ a(1 + nt)
b) ¡ St; (4)
c
t
t+1 = (1 + rt+1)(St + Wtts) + (1 + nt)Wt+1Gt+1: (5)
In this case, the social security system budget is automatically balanced.
2.3 Production Function
The single homogenous good serves both as capital and as consumption good.
As in GY, this good is produced in a competitive industry under constant re-
turns to scale according to a concave production function. Hence the number of
3We exclude the possibility that the adult generation have heterogenous preference toward
parents. That is, all adult generations like their parents.
7…rms is irrelevant and we will assume a single …rm for simplicity. The aggregate
production function F is
Yt = F [Kt;AtLt]; (6)
where Yt is aggregate output, Kt is aggregate capital stock, Lt is aggregate labour
supply and At is the technological spillover, which is an increasing function of





where m is a scaling productivity parameter: the higher m, the lower labour
productivity. (6) implies that there is a positive spillover from the size of the
aggregate capital stock to the productivity of workers in individual …rms (i.e.
Romer type externality). In equilibrium, Lt = Nt. Let kt = Kt=AtLt be the








=) F [Kt;AtLt] = AtLtf(kt):
The …rst-order conditions for pro…t maximization for the capital and the
labour markets are
1 + rt = f¶ (kt); (8)
Wt = [f(kt) ¡ ktf¶ (kt)]At; (9)
where rt is the interest rate and Wt is the wage rate. Let wt = Wt=At be the
wage-per-e¢ciency-unit. Since the interest rate rt is a function of capital per
e¢ciency unit kt, the implicit function theorem and (8) and (9) imply that the










Substituting for kt into (8), we …nd that the interest rate is constant over
time, rt = r, and so is the wage-per-e¢ciency-unit (10), wt = w:





Because the wage-per-e¢ciency-unit is constant, the wage rate Wt grows at






Because the capital-per-e¢ciency-unit ratio is constant, the capital per worker
(b k) also grows at the rate of growth of technological spillover (At). Let g be this
common constant growth rate











Physical capital is the only outlet for aggregate savings and accumulation. In the
PAYG system, contributions to social security are used to pay for the bene…ts of
the retirees and do not add to the aggregate savings. In the fully-funded system,
individual contributions are invested by the social security system into physical

















Capital-per-e¢ciency-unit k, wage-per-e¢ciency-unit w, and the interest rate
r are the same in both systems. However, savings St, fertility nt, capital stock
9Kt and all other endogenous variables may be di¤erent from one system to the
other. Under both systems, savings St are a function S, constant over time, of
the wage rate Wt and of the constant interest rate r4




Since preferences are homothetic
8¸ ¸ 0; S
j(¸Wt;r) = ¸S
j(Wt;r): (16)
The saving function is an increasing function of both arguments: that is,
@Sj=@Wt > 0 and @Sj=@rt > 0.
3 Balanced Growth Analysis
The aim of this section is to characterise, if it exists, the equilibrium balanced
growth path of our economy. As it turns out, the homotheticity of the utility
function, assumption 1, is a necessary condition for the existence of a such a bal-
anced growth path. We already know that, at an equilibrium, the wage rate and
the capital per worker grow at the same rate as technological spillover. Further-







t+1 = Wt+1=Wt = 1 + g). These considerations prompt us
to de…ne the balanced growth path as the path along which all of these variables
grow at the same rate. In addition, balanced growth paths are often associated
with constant fertility rates, see for instance Yip and Zhang (1996) or Blackburn
and Cipriani (1998).
De…nition 1 The balanced growth path is an equilibrium path such that (i) per-
capita consumption for the adult, and old age periods, technological spillovers,
wage rate and capital-per-worker all grow at the same constant rate g: gct
t =
gct
t+1 = gA = gW = gb k = g; (ii) the rate of population growth is constant over
time (denoted by n).
4See Azariadis (1993, pp228 and excercise II-29)
10As in GY, we are going to show that the growth rate of the economy g is
inversely proportional to the rate of population growth n on a balanced growth
path. However, unlike GY, for which the fertility rate was exogenous, n is an
endogenous variable in our model. In section 5, we will study how the choice of
the pension system a¤ects n.
The balanced growth rate is given by






Substituting (14) and (15) into (17) yields, respectively,
1 + g
PAY G =
SPAY G(W PAY G
t ;r)
















is growing at the common
rate g, savings-per-e¢ciency-unit Sj(w;r) is constant over time, thanks to the
homotheticity of preferences (16)

















Also note that w and r are the same for both pension systems. Using this











Both (20) and (21) imply that the balanced growth rate increases with savings,
which is a standard result of the endogenous growth literature. In section 5, see
(28), we will show that in fact on the balanced growth path, aggregate savings
are the same under both systems: SPAY G(w;r) = SFunded(w;r) + wts. Hence,
the regime of social security will only a¤ect the balanced growth rate through its
e¤ect on fertility.
11Before considering the impact of social security on economic growth, we …rst
need to re…ne our concept of equilibrium by introducing the notion of open-loop
equilibrium.
4 Open-Loop Equilibrium
The original papers on ascending altruism, NZ and O’Connell and Zeldes (1993),
used a static concept of Nash equilibrium. Fudenberg and Tirole (1996) have
argued that this static concept is inappropriate in the context of a dynamic OLG
model. We are adopting their concept of “open-loop equilibrium” which deals
with this de…ciency.
In the overlapping generation model, the “Nash game”, i.e. a game in which
all moves are simultaneous, is inappropriate because there is only one active
player in each period: the adult generation who does not face any opponent. The
proper setting is a multi-stage game whose equilibrium concept has been labelled
the “open-loop equilibrium”. In the open-loop model, agents must precommit to
an entire time path of actions without observing neither the past nor the future
moves of other players. That is, each adult agent regards the moves of its parents
and children as given.
4.1 Construction of Game
At time t, the only players are the adult generation which is composed of iden-
tical agents. We concentrate on the problem of the representative agent. At
time t, given the actions of the other agents (past and future generations),
the representative agent takes an action concerning, simultaneously, his savings,







2 Xt = <5
+, where Xt is the set of all possible ac-
tions and <+ is the positive half-line.
In the open-loop game, the representative agent t will maximize his utility
12function subject to the budget constraints, taking at¡1and at+1 , and the govern-
ment pension policy (P) as given. The pension policy P consists of the choice of a
pension system, PAYG or fully-funded, and of the contribution rate and bene…t.
When this maximization problem admits a solution, then, for each t, there exists
a sequence of actions a¤
t such that the utility generated by a¤
t is higher than the
utility generated by any alternative admissible action
»
at. Thus we postulate the
following de…nition for the open-loop equilibrium.






























t+1are actions of generation t ¡ 1 and t + 1, respectively and P
denotes the government’s pension policy.
4.2 Consumer optimum when the utility is logarithmic
As an example, suppose that the instantaneous utility function, u, is logarithmic.


















st: (2) and (3):
Under the fully-funded system, the maximization problem is identical, except
that the budget constraints (2) and (3) are replaced by (4) and (5). In both case,
after substituting the current and future consumption into the objective function,


























13An adult today can increase his current consumption by decreasing his sav-
ings (with adverse consequences for his consumption when old), by decreasing
his gift to his parents (which hurts him because of his ascending altruism) or by
decreasing his expenditure on child-rearing (with adverse consequences on the
total gift he will be receiving from his children when old). At an optimum, the
marginal utility from adult consumption must be equal to (according to the …rst
equation) the discounted marginal utility of the corresponding increase in con-
sumption when old, to (according to the second equation) the marginal utility of
the corresponding increase in the gift to one’s parents. The third equation states
that the marginal utility lost through child-rearing must equal the discounted
marginal bene…t received through the increased gift from his children.
5 Balanced Growth Fertility under Each Sys-
tem
Many authors in the public …nance literature have reported that population age-
ing threatens to unbalance the budget of the pension plan system. These au-
thors, notably Feldstein, have argued that attempts at balancing the pension
plan budget by increasing payroll tax rate would reduce the working-age popula-
tion’s incentive to save. Capital accumulation would be reduced and the growth
rate would fall. Instead, they have suggested that the PAYG system should be
replaced by a fully-funded or privatised pension system. However, this line of
research has, so far, ignored the e¤ect of such a switch on fertility rates, which in
turn would have implications for long-run growth. The purpose of this section is
to investigate this question.
5.1 Impact of Social Security on fertility
From the …rst order conditions (22) and (23), we …nd that the balanced growth
rate is negatively related with fertility rate and that this relationship is the same
14for both pension system

















Under both regimes, an increase of altruism decreases savings-per-e¢ciency
units because it leads to a higher gift. (26) indicates that savings-per-e¢ciency
units are independent of the contribution rate ts. This e¤ect is very similar to
Barro’s “Ricardian equivalence theorem” (Barro (1974)), except that the public
“undoes” the government taxation policy by adjusting their gift to their parents
rather than by adjusting their savings. Suppose the government increases the
contribution rate ts, thereby increasing the bene…ts of the retirees. The adult
generation experiences a loss of after-tax income, but they also notice that their
parents are receiving a higher entitlement. Consider the case in which the adults
decrease their gift to their parents one-for-one relative to their higher payroll
contribution. Their income after payroll tax and gift to the elderly is the same
as before; the retirees are also getting the same net income as before, more from
social security but less from their children. Hence, this allocation is identical to
the one prior to the increase in ts and is an optimum. By contrast, an increase
of the payroll tax in the funded pension system is exactly o¤set by a decrease in
savings-per-e¢ciency-unit. Combining (26) and (27), we verify that, as stated in
section 3,
S
PAY G (w;r) = S
Funded (w;r) + wts: (28)
Next, we derive fertility in each case. For the reminder of the paper, we assume
µ = 1. First, we derive the relationship between gift and fertility. Assuming,
15combining (22) and (24) yields for both pension systems











(1 + r)(1 + n
j)
b¡1: (29)
In the case of the PAYG [resp. fully-funded] system, substituting(2) and (3)
[resp. (4) and (5)] into (22) yields, respectively
2S





































t+1 (1 + nFunded)
1 + r
:
Note that bt+1 = (1 + nPAY G)WPAY G
t+1 ts. Dividing (30) and (31) by A
j
t and

















w ¡ 2(SFunded(w;r) + wts)








w ¡ 2SPAY G(w;r)




Recall that SFunded may depend on the contribution rate ts, but that SPAY G
does not. (32) implies that, under a PAYG system, fertility decreases with the
contribution rate. By contrast, (34) shows that, under a fully-funded system, the
contribution rate does not a¤ect fertility. This result is summarised in the next
proposition.
Proposition 1 Assume µ = 1 (no discounting of future consumption). In a
PAYG pension system, an increase in the social security payroll tax decreases
fertility. In a fully-funded pension system, the payroll tax has no e¤ect on fertility.
16In a PAYG system, an increase in the payroll tax (and in its corresponding
bene…ts) replaces, for the retirees, private support from their children with pub-
lic support. As children become less useful to parents, adults will reduce their
fertility. Under the funded pension system, social security does not a¤ect fertil-
ity because the payroll tax only a¤ects private savings and no other endogenous
variables: private savings are exactly o¤set by the payroll tax.
Note that, if ts > 0, nominator in (32) is less than the one in (34). Therefore,
fertility in the funded pension system is greater than one in the PAYG pension
system. This result is summarised in the next proposition.
Proposition 2 Assume µ = 1 and ts > 0. The PAYG pension system is char-
acterised by a higher fertility rate than the funded pension system.
To understand this second proposition, let us …rst consider both pension sys-
tems when the payroll tax ts = 0. It is clear that, in this case, the economic
allocation is the same as if there were no pension system at all. An immediate
consequence is that the fertility rate will also be the same, as can be checked
from (32) and (34)
n
Funded(ts = 0) = n
PAY G(ts = 0) =
￿
w ¡ 2SPAY G(w;r)




Let the payroll tax increase. From proposition 1, we know that nFunded(ts)
does not change, and that nPAY G (ts) decreases, hence the proposition.
A consequence of proposition 2 and of the fact that a higher fertility is as-
sociated with a lower growth rate is that a fully-funded pension system will
under-perform a PAYG system in terms of economic growth, as stated in the
next proposition.
Proposition 3 Assume µ = 1. A PAYG pension system generates a higher
balanced growth rate than a fully-funded pension system. The rate of growth
under the PAYG system increases with the payroll tax ts.
17Proof. We know from (28) that the savings-per-e¢ciency-unit (including
contributions to the social security system in the case of the fully-funded system)
are the same under both regimes. Hence, the numerators in (20) and (21), the
equations characterising the balance growth rates, are equal. Therefore, whether
the growth rate of the PAYG system is higher or lower than the growth rate of
the fully-funded system depends solely on whether the fertility rate is lower or
higher in the PAYG system. Since we know from proposition 2 that the former
is true, …rst part of the proposition is established. The second part is a direct
consequence of the relationship between fertility and growth (20). Q.E.D.
The engine of growth in our model is the technological spillover. A lower
fertility rate implies a higher rate of growth of our technological spillover, as can
be seen from our production function (7). Since a PAYG system reduces fertility,
proposition 2, it outperforms a fully-funded system in terms of growth.
5.2 Empirical evidence
Our result is very much in line and can provide an explanation with the empirical
result in Sala-I-Martin (1996). Estimating an equation that explains economic
growth rate using initial GDP, public investment, public consumption, and public
transfers, he found that the only signi…cant variable positively correlated with
growth is public transfers. He concluded that social security is conducive to
growth. His explanation was that social security buys the elderly out of the
labour force, which is conducive to the economic growth because output per
capita is higher if the elderly do not work.
Our results suggests an alternative and complimentary explanation, and adds
a word of caution to his result. In our model, under a PAYG, an increase in
the payroll tax ts will increase the rate of growth of the economy (proposition
3). It also quali…es as an increase in public transfers, hence validates Sala-I-
Martin’s empirical results. However, we found that an increase in ts would not
have any e¤ect under a fully-funded system. Essentially, in a fully-funded system,
18pension plan contributions are perfect substitutes for private savings. Although
an increase in the payroll tax would be recorded as an increase in public transfers,
in practice it has no redistributional e¤ects. Hence, one should be careful when
applying Sala-I-Martin’s …ndings to public policy as what appears to be a public
transfer may turn out to be something quite di¤erent.
6 Saving Subsidy Program
6.1 Description of the SSP
Social Security reform has often meant little more than switching from a PAYG
to a fully-funded system. Our analysis suggests that such a switch may actually
prove harmful to growth. In this section, we propose a new system for social
security with the purpose of enhancing economic growth.
In the two systems considered so far, PAYG and fully-funded, …scal policy
has no impact on savings in the following sense: the savings-per-e¢ciency-unit
(including contribution to social security in the fully-funded system) is una¤ected
by the payroll tax rate, see (28). The scheme we propose, the Saving Subsidy
Program (SSP), is designed to raise the said savings which will deliver higher
rates of capital accumulation and of economic growth. The SSP will also reduce
fertility rates, which we have seen is helpful for growth in our model.
The SSP programme is a two-part programme: a minimum bene…t, b, to each
retiree, and a subsidy to savings. More precisely, if an household saves at time
t (when adult) SSSP(W SSP
t ;r), under this programme it will receive the bene…t
bSSP
t+1 at time t + 1 given by
b
SSP
t+1 = b + qS
SSP(W
SSP
t ;r); 0 < q < 1: (35)
The payroll tax rate is set at a level that will balance the system’s budget
b
SSP




19Substituting this identity into (35) leads to













































t+1 = (1 + r)St ¡ (1 + nt)Wt+1Gt+1 + bt+1(St):
The …rst-order conditions with respect to fertility (23) and gift (24) are iden-
tical to those in the PAYG and fully-funded systems. However, the …rst-order









Equation (37) re‡ects the higher rate of return on savings due to the subsidy.




(1 + r + q)µ
¿
: (38)
Capital accumulation is identical to the one in the PAYG system. Thus, the
growth rate of capital per worker is given by (20). Savings-per-e¢ciency-unit in
the SSP system is given by
S
SSP (w;r) = S




Note that these savings are higher than those in the PAYG and fully-funded
systems. Now, plugging WSSP
t+1 = W SSP






t (1 + r + q)
+
qSSSP(w;r)
1 + r + q
: (40)
























Proposition 4 An increase in the rate of savings subsidy, q, leads to an increase
in savings-per-e¢ciency-unit and a decrease in fertility.





















Intuition is simple. As the government increases saving subsidy, the adult
generations tend to increase saving by the substitution e¤ect. The higher return
on savings means that investment into children is less attractive reducing fertility.
Since the balanced growth rate depends positively on saving and negatively
on fertility, we have the following propositions:
Proposition 5 The SSP is growth-enhancing.






















@q > 0 and @nSSP
@q < 0. Q.E.D.
Proposition 6 1+gSSP > 1+gPAY G > 1+gFunded




1 + nPAY G¢b ¡ SPAY G(w;r)
q
1+r+q




This implies 1 + nSSP < 1 + nPAY G. Therefore, SSSP(w;r) > SPAY G (w;r)and
1 + nSSP < 1 + nPAY G yields the …rst inequality. The second inequality comes
from proposition 3. Q.E.D.
7 Conclusion
A number of studies have over the years argued that the current social security
…nanced by the PAYG system should be replaced by the fully-funded pension
system or the privately managed system in order to alleviate the enormous tax
burden on the oncoming young generations and keep the level of bene…t intact
for the elderly. It is argued that while generations alive during the transition
face higher …scal burdens, privatisation can o¤er substantial long-run economic
gains[see Feldstein and Samwick (1998) and Kotliko¤ (1996)].
This paper shows that there are reasons to believe that these proposed reforms
may adversely a¤ect the long-run growth prospects. We propose a pension scheme
that would o¤er better growth prospects than current and proposed schemes.
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